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Abstract
In no other sector is the challenge of governance much more tasking in contemporary 
Nigeria than security. Conceived broadly to imply both physical and human security, 
security has remained at the core of Nigeria’s governance challenges since its return to 
democracy in 1999. Weak institutions, growing inequality, poverty, injustice and corruption 
have together undermined the capacity of democracy as a preferred system of rule, to 
salvage the nation’s security from prolonged years of military rule and inept leadership. 
With Nigeria’s almost two decades of democratic experience, and the recent ushering to 
power of another party, the first of this development since 1999, there is indeed, an urgent 
need for the overhaul of the sector if the expected gains of democracy are to be met. It is 
the contention of this paper that democracy and security are mutually reinforcing and a 
disconnect can have deleterious implications for Nigeria. This paper also stresses the need 
to revamp the country’s security institutions especially in the light of the internal challenges 
of Boko Haram and in particular, militia groups whose propensity to relapse into military 
confrontation under the guise of the underlying historical problems associated with the 
Nigerian state are well documented.
Keywords: Democracy consolidation, security and governance.
Introduction
The Nigerian state, a British creation, wedging together diverse, multiple ethnic groups and 
identities, has historically evinced varying features of complexity since its birth in 1914. 
Given this complex arrangement, the greatest threat to its security has always been itself. 
Upon independence, the responsibility for managing this diversity was bequeathed to a 
cream of leaders who were themselves not immune from the ethno-religious sentiments that 
incessantly threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria and exposed the fractured nature of 
the country’s fragile composition. The task of nation-building was intermittently thwarted 
by frequent military incursions that characterized three decades of post-independence 
Nigerian politics. While those early years represented a vantage opportunity for the oil-
rich and most populous black nation on earth to engineer a political leadership that puts the 
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people at the heart of governance, politics was rather driven by various forms and shades of 
unethical practices that promoted violence, injustice and corruption. By implication, neither 
the physical security nor basic human wants were within reach of a vastly growing national 
population. 
In particular, Nigeria had never been to war with another country or entity and had hardly 
been faced with a serious external threat which showed the laxity with which the nation’s 
authorities had handled national security matters until 1967 during the civil war. This was 
the first time Nigeria seriously felt threatened and this prompted a policy re-evaluation of 
its national security. Even the attack by Cameroon gendermes on Nigeria’s security officers 
stationed along the once disputed Bakassi Peninsula did not draw a military retaliation from 
the country’s leadership which preferred diplomacy above all else. 
With the decades of oppression under successive military regimes terminated in 1999 and 
Nigeria’s celebrated return to civil rule, expectations were high regarding the limitless 
opportunities that the emerging democratic climate in the country offers. This also 
coincided with the changing perception of security globally from the restricted view which 
solely identifies it with the military into a more holistic view which today, embraces also 
the essential task of meeting basic human wants. It is also contended that democracy and 
security are intertwined with the former having the capacity to help secure the objectives 
of the latter. However, a sore point in Nigeria’s democratic experience in over a decade of 
civilian rule captures a catalogue of abuses, and unprofessional, partisan and anti-democratic 
practices championed by the state security against civilians on the one hand and a failure to 
translate the promises of democracy into concrete developments that free or attempt to free 
the citizenry from wants. Thus, in many ways, current realities largely reflect the imageries 
of the past. The inability to secure these basic needs among others has triggered the rise of 
militant groups whose permanence has continued to question Nigeria’s approach to threats 
within its borders. But more fundamentally, it raises fundamental questions about the 
quality of Nigeria’s democracy and its ability to reinforce national capacity in the pursuit 
of security goals. 
Democracy, Democratic Consolidation and Security Governance
Democracy as a form of government aims primarily at guaranteeing political and socio-
economic rights and freedom. Democracy encourages participation, openness, and permits 
the exercise of individual choice as well as promotes institution building. Unlike a number 
of other regions, Africa’s experience with liberal democracy took a significant upward path 
from the 1980s. Following many years under colonial and military rules, democracy became 
fashionable for Africa not because it was so desired but because first, it was a requirement 
for obtaining the desperately needed loans from the Brettonwood institutions. Secondly, 
by 1990, it had no ideology competing with it following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Thirdly, the end of the Cold War exposed the fragility of many African countries which 
had been held together by aid support from the hitherto two dominant blocs and who had 
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to adjust their political system to the dictates of the post-Cold War Order. Thus, African 
countries opted for a system they neither understood nor could understand or were ready 
to adapt to the peculiarities of their own traditional political practices. Current adaptations 
have only created worse forms of democracy through the legitimization of authoritarianism, 
dictatorship and patronage. For instance, only Ghana representing less than 2% of the 54 
African countries qualifies as a full democracy while the others are either partially free or 
not free according to Freedom House (Freedom House, 2013, 2014 and 2015)1.
One central concern then lies in trying to understand the extent or degree to which 
democracy exists in a given country. In measuring democracy, there is the general (mis) 
understanding in some quarters, among educated and non-literates, that physical projects 
can be regarded as the dividends of democracy. However, democratic dividends are not just 
about visible, tangible projects but about the rights to enjoy fundamental elements of liberty, 
openness and participation, which inadvertently translate into a variety of opportunities 
for the individual. Also, a fundamental feature of liberal democracy is the people power, 
expressed through the conduct of and participation in elections, to determine who governs 
them. Therefore, countries that have institutionalized this within their political framework 
are considered democracies or more specifically, electoral democracies. The excessive 
emphasis on electoral democracy has come almost at the expense of real democracy which 
rather offers more in terms of substance than name. These dichotomies have given rise to 
democracy under different guises and labels such as authoritarian democracies, pretend 
democracies, etc. Though fundamental, electoral decision-making is but one of the many 
rights that democracy promises. 
Table 1
Democracy Index 2010 – 2015
Year Rank Score Total Regime Categorization
2010 123 3.47 167 Authoritarian
2011 119 3.83 167 Authoritarian
2012 N/P N/P N/P N/P
2013 121 3.77 167 Authoritarian
2014 =123 3.76 167 Authoritarian
2015 108 4.62 167 Hybrid
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit
On the other hand, democratic consolidation is about consistent and sustained practice of 
democratic principles (Yagboyaju, 2013).2 For Asiwaju (2000), democratic consolidation 
“implies the internationalization of democratic culture and the institutionalization of 
democratic “best practices” by a polity that has successfully embarked on a democratic 
transition”.3 It is about conduct, philosophy and ideas that promote democratic tenets. It may 
also be inclusive of efforts or struggles to liberalize a democracy that is already in place. 
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It includes institutional changes that expand socio-economic and political opportunities 
for all peoples irrespective of sex, economic status or age. When democratic processes, 
principles and practices are preserved, or improved upon, then democracy is being nurtured 
into a state of maturity. Democracy consolidation presupposes that there is democracy in 
place which is being consolidated. It also assumes that every democracy takes a path of 
consolidation perhaps due to the fact that every system, in time and space, evolves through 
its own particularities and the changing conditions which may be domestic and/or external. 
Two points are notable, first, the quality of democracy varies and electoral democracies that 
have sustained records of abuse and violations of fundamental rights and dignity of citizens, 
or lost the capacity to oversee borders such as in Somalia or where citizen voices have been 
profoundly suppressed cannot be said to be consolidating.
Democracy continues to shape how we think about the world and how best to respond 
to new threats and the growing needs of humanity. The nexus between democracy and 
security has been well established. In particular, the re-conceptualization of security 
from its traditional fixation on the state to the individual represents an important shift in 
the attempt to understand the complex nature of modern society and its accompanying 
challenges. Security is today understood to mean freedom from a wide range of threats 
such as wants, poverty and rights violations. According to the Human Development 
Report 1994, the concept of security has changed from one focused on nations, arms, and 
territory to a greater concern with people, human development, food, employment, and the 
environment (Human Development Report, 1994).4 The Human Security Report 2003, also 
defined security as being linked to the enhancement of the livelihood of all people at risk; 
the values of the respect of human rights; dignity of the individual, respect for diversity, 
community empowerment, decentralized forms of government, peace and co-existence, and 
the accountability and transparency of actions aimed at creating betterment of livelihood 
(Human Security Report, 2003).5 In a sense, these ideas and arguments are part of the efforts 
at projecting democracy’s inherent capacity to effectively secure the goals of security in a 
contemporary international system.
Furthermore, relevant actors within the security sector include all those organizations that 
have the authority to use, or order the use of, force or threat of force, to protect the state 
and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management 
and oversight (Chalmers, 2000).6 The OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System and 
Governance Reform define the broader security system as ‘‘which includes all the actors, 
their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system 
in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good 
governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework’’ and consists 
of the core security actors; security management and oversight bodies: the executive; 
justice and law enforcement institutions; and non-statutory security forces (OECD, 2004).7 
Summarily, democratic governance of the security sector must exhibit: accountability and 
transparency; existence of avenues for seeking redress; legitimacy; voice and participation 
of the civil society and professionals. More comprehensive criteria are offered by Ball 
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et al. which include high priority to human rights protection, high public awareness and 
engagement, and regional approaches to security problems (Ball, & Fayemi, 2004).8
Hutchful (2003) observed that the current liberal order reinforces the linkage between 
security and democracy. For him, policy choices made about the management and control of 
the military and security forces have significant implications for democratic consolidation, 
conflict prevention and the quest for sustainable peace. Apart from democracy helping to 
secure security objectives, democratic consolidation is difficult, if not impossible, in an 
atmosphere of insecurity.9 Corroborating this viewpoint, Ball et al. stressed that effective 
governance of the security sector is central to achieving successful democratic consolidation 
and sustainable economic and social development (Ball et al., 2003).10 Therefore, at the core 
of the security sector, governance must be the promotion and respect for human rights and the 
rule of law as well as the monitoring of the security sector policy by a well-informed, vibrant 
and independent civil society sector. Insecurity arises as a result of exclusion, injustice, lack 
of access to power and resources. Democracy, on the other hand, is a veritable instrument in 
adjusting this socio-economic and political imbalance which aims at empowering citizens 
to exercise critical rights to engender anticipated developmental outcomes.
Similarly, reform of the security sector helps consolidate good, responsible, and accountable 
governance. However, security sector reform without accompanying political and social 
reforms may defeat the purpose of reform. According to Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 
strengthening the institutional framework for managing the security sector involves three 
broad challenges: (a) to ensure the proper location of security activities within a constitutional 
framework defined by law, and to develop security policies and instruments to implement 
them; (b) to build the capacity of policy-makers to assess the nature of security threats 
effectively and (c) to design strategic responses supportive of wider development goals; 
and to strengthen mechanisms for ensuring security sector accountability by enabling the 
state and non-state actors responsible for monitoring security policy and enforcing the law 
to fulfil their functions effectively (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2005).11
 
The Security Environment in Nigeria: A Synopsis
The security sector in Nigeria is managed by a variety of actors whose contributions are 
not only critical but have impacted on the nature and character of the country’s security 
apparatus. Nigeria’s security architecture consists of five categories of actors which are 
tabulated below. Each category of actors plays important roles in the fulfillment of national 
security objectives. More importantly, the idea of checks and balances among the highlighted 
institutions and in particular, the watchdog role by civil society organizations remain 
essential to the delivery of security services that meet both state and individual needs. Since 
Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 1999, efforts have been made by successive administrations 
via constitutional processes to re-define the roles, responsibilities and powers of old and 
new governance institutions to reflect democratic principles and ethos.
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Primary Security 
Actors
Justice and Law 
Enforcement 
Organizations
Security 
Management and 
Oversight Bodies
Non -Statutory 
Security 
Organizations
Civil Society 
Organizations
Armed Forces (army, 
navy and airforce; 
police; gendarmeries; 
paramilitary 
forces; presidential 
guards; intelligence 
and security services 
(both military and 
civilian); coast guards; 
customs authorities; 
and reserve or local 
security units, civil 
defense forces, 
national guards, 
militias).
The judiciary, justice 
ministries, 
prisons; criminal 
investigation and 
persecution services; 
human rights 
commissions and 
ombudsmen; and 
customary and 
traditional justice 
systems
The executive; 
national 
security advisory 
bodies; legislature 
and legislative 
select committees; 
ministries 
of defense, internal 
affairs and foreign 
affairs; customary 
and traditional 
authorities; 
and financial 
management bodies 
(finance, audit and 
planning units).
Liberation 
armies, guerilla 
armies, private 
body guard units; 
private security 
companies; and 
political party 
militias
 Civilian review 
boards and public 
complaints 
commissions, 
professional 
associations and 
trade unions
Adapted from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD DAC) Guidelines on Security System and Governance Reform (2005); and Fayemi, J. K. 
(2008)
As succinctly expressed by Fayemi amd Olonisakin (2008), pivotal to security reform is 
the understanding that security of both the state and its population will be maximized to 
the extent that security organizations are subordinate to democratically-elected authorities 
(Fayemi and Olonisakin, 2008).12 Thus, one of the principal changes to the security sector 
was witnessed under President Olusegun who undertook some steps to subject the state’s 
security structures to executive, legislative and judicial control. Although, similar actions 
have been sustained over the years to strengthen Nigeria’s security system, the country’s 
national security scorecard remains abysmal due to institutionalized military orientation, 
parochial interests, partisanship, and constitutional and institutional weaknesses. For 
instance, the inherited constitution accedes too much power to the presidents who in 
characteristic fashion, have consistently employed the same for nefarious uses during 
elections against political opponents and for showmanship. This has inadvertently left the 
country in more precarious situations given the competing ethno-religious and monetary 
interests of the political class.
In 2014, Nigeria was reported to have the unenviable record of nine (9) of the twenty (20) 
most fatal terrorist attacks. Alongside Iraq, both countries were responsible for 53% terrorism 
related deaths in 2014 (Global Terrorism Index, 2015: 13-14).13 Between 2000 and 2014, 
Nigeria has been ranked six times in the ten countries most affected by terrorism. Within 
the same period, the Boko haram was responsible for most deaths in Nigeria followed by 
the Fulani herdsmen (Ibid:15).14 From 2014 to 2015, Nigeria is believed to be among the 
countries to have deteriorated the most under the failed states index mapping (Fragile States 
Index, 2015:12).15 Arising from these numerous insurgency attacks was a massive human 
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displacement which stood at 1.8 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 201, 591 
refugees as on April 30, 2016 (UNHCR, 2016).16 The implications of this development 
cannot be over-emphasized especially when considered in the light of Nigeria’s status and 
demography; and the notoriety of the sub-regions security and stability problems. As a 
further consequence, the 2015/16 Global Competitiveness Index ranks Nigeria 124 out of 
140 countries assessed, a marginal improvement from the 127 it was ranked in the 2014/15 
survey (World Economic Forum, 2015-2016)17, while it ranked 170 and 169 out of 189 
countries examined for ease of doing business in the 2015 and 2016 reports together, 
reflecting the deleterious impact of the appalling security situation in Nigeria (Doing 
Business, 2015, 2016: 4 & 5).18 
Table 2
Impact of Terrorism: First Five Most Affected Countries
Global Terrorism Index Score 
(2015)
Score 
(2014)
Fragile States Index (2015)
Rank (2015) Rank (2014) Countries Countries Rank Classification 
1 1 Iraq 10 10 Syria =8 High Alert
2 2 Afghanistan 9.233 9.39 Afghanistan =8 High Alert
3 4 Nigeria 9.213 9.37 Iraq =11 High Alert
4 3 Pakistan 9.065 8.58 Pakistan 13 High Alert
5 5 Syria 8.108 8.12 Nigeria 14 High Alert
Global Terrorism Index 2014, 2015.
These statistics lend strong credence to the state of security in Nigeria vis-à-vis the quality 
of governance. The current situation is not entirely new and has its roots in the permissive 
security environment created by years of inept leadership. Indeed, the history of Nigeria’s 
security environment is not significantly different from what happened in most parts of 
Africa from the colonial to the post-colonial periods. Security has hardly been used to 
serve the interests of the people. Prior to 1999, Nigeria had spent much of its independence 
under military regimes thereby, leaving no room for democracy to take roots. Typically, 
the Nigerian state operated with brute force in the management of its internal affairs as 
security structure was either used to witch-hunt dissident voices or to protect or unseat 
one regime after another. Put differently, security objectives were not aimed at securing 
essential human wants but for the preservation of the regime. As observed by one author, 
the attempts by successive leaders to appeal to national, ethnic, communal and religious 
loyalties weakened the solidarity of the people, created strong divisions and exclusivity 
which increased the premium on political power and the intensity of political competition. 
Indeed, the military rule in Nigeria was characterized by impunity, virtual disrespect for the 
constitution as an instrument for safeguarding citizens’ interests and rights, visionless and 
purposeless leadership, and waste and considerable acts of repression. All of these created 
a psyche of fear and despondency among the Nigerians and persisted under democratic 
administrations since 1999.
ht
tp
://
jis
.u
um
.e
du
.m
y
Olusola Olawale Olasunkanmi
134
Also, given the prolonged years under military rule, existing institutions still largely 
reflected the principles and practices of the old order. In other words, democratic transition 
was not accompanied by a fundamental change in the institutions of the state. The military’s 
influence continues to define the country’s political order. Several actions and reactions by 
the new leadership also revealed its intolerance to democratic ethos. The indiscriminate 
reprisal attacks on the Odi community in Bayelsa and Zaki-Biam in Benue state by the 
Nigerian military are reference of the points Human Rights Watch World Report, 2000 & 
2001).19 Journalists were arrested on trump charges and harassed as was the case during the 
military years. The penchant of the civilian administration for responding with force to civil 
matters indicated that the country still had a long way to go.
Also, the Nigerian security environment has been characterized by violence arising from 
cut cutthroat competitions during elections. While the successful transition from civilian to 
civilian administrations remains a positive development in Nigeria’s democratization process, 
virtually every election has resulted in large scale violence due to the desperation of office- 
seekers who see political posts as access to the state treasury. Election results also largely 
reveal voting patterns that reinforce ethnicity as a strong determining factor in preference of 
electorates. Within political parties and during elections proper, violence continues to mar 
the conduct of elections in a manner that partly account for the marginalization of women 
in Nigerian politics. The 2007 elections were so rigged that it was described as the worst in 
the country’s history. The 2011 elections, on the other hand, witnessed state-wide violence 
that almost threatened the survival of the Nigerian state.
In addition, no other development adequately captures Nigeria’s security environment 
like the rise of ethnic militias such as the Bakassi boys, the Egbesu boys, Oodua Peoples 
Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of the State of Biafra (MASSOB) and 
more recently, Boko Haram and the Niger Delta Avengers. Considerable debates exist 
on whether democracy inherently promotes violence. According to Abdu Hussaini, while 
recurring violence under democratic rule may be attributable to poor governance and 
leadership, the tendency to associate democracy with violence can be better understood 
when considered in the light of the freedom it bestows on the hitherto suppressed voices, 
identities and discontents. Thus, despite the return to civil rule, cries of marginalization and 
injustice continue to radicalize the Niger Delta as different groups emerge to stake claims on 
behalf of the region. The emergence of Boko haram, one of the deadliest insurgent groups 
globally, is also traceable to acts of injustice by the state against the members of the sect, in 
particular, the unexplained circumstances under which the sect’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, 
died and the inability of the relevant authorities to swiftly bring the alleged culprits to book. 
Fundamentally, all of these groups have been sustained in one form of the other due to a 
patronage system. 
Of all Nigerian institutions, the Nigerian Police Force has been the most vilified national 
institution due largely to their penchant for corruption. For many Nigerians, the black 
uniform adorned by police officers is in every way synonymous with greed, injustice, 
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bad omen and repression. The NPF may find no competitor for the position of the most 
corrupt institution in Nigeria, except perhaps second only to the Civil Service. Several 
cases of abuses are perpetuated by this important institution supposedly saddled with the 
responsibility to protect lives and civil order. Experiences indicate that they perform exactly 
the opposite. Indeed, one must be quick to add that the institution has also suffered years 
of neglect by the executive. Policemen in Nigeria are generally underpaid and the majority 
of them do not appear to have the wherewithal for a modest life. Indeed, they were prime 
targets for Boko Haram insurgents for many years. It is argued here that this was so because 
of the insurgents’ awareness of the inherent weaknesses of the institution. 
Table 3
The Fifteen Most Vulnerable Countries 2012, 2013 and 2014
Rank Country (2013) Score Rank Country (2013) Score Rank Countries Score
1 Eritrea 75.35 1 Afghanistan 75.41 1 Chad 75.72
2 Niger 75.17 2 Chad 74.28 2 Haiti 73.79
3 Chad 74.74 3 Eritrea 74.23 3 Afghanistan 73.73
4 Afghanistan 74.32 4 Niger 73.21 4 Eritrea 73.18
5 Haiti 73.54 5 Haiti 73.05 5 Central African 
Republic
72.22
6 Sierra Leone 72.20 6 Sierra Leone 70.75 6 Niger 72.12
7 Liberia 71.74 7 Liberia 70.31 7 Sierra-Leone 72.10
8 Mozambique 71.37 8 Central African 
Republic
69.98 8 Liberia 72.03
9 Guinea 71.05 9 Mozambique 69.85 9 Guinea 70.94
10 Central African 
Republic
70.69 10 Guinea 69.21 10 Mozambique 70.89
11 Ethiopia 70.21 11 Madagascar 69.18 11 Mali 70.53
12 Mali 69.76 12 Burundi 69.17 12 Burundi 70.00
13 Burundi 69.32 13 Nigeria 68.99 13 Guinea-Bissau 69.94
14 Nigeria 68.70 14 Mali 68.90 14 Madagascar 69.86
15 Togo 68.39 15 Comoros 68.56 15 Nigeria 69.33
Source: World Risk Report, 2012.
Again, from 2003 to date, records of using the military to harass and intimidate opposition 
members and their supporters by the ruling party have been widespread in Nigeria. In 
the recently concluded elections in Ekiti state in 2014, the tribunal while dismissing the 
opposition’s case against the declared winner admitted credible evidence of the use of the 
military to ill-treat members of the opposition. Also, prior to the 2015 general elections, 
the court delivered a verdict declaring that the military had no business with elections 
as it is purely a civilian affair. Notwithstanding the judgment, the army was deployed in 
their numbers for the election. The flipside of these actions was the politicization of the 
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military institution to aid and abet their paymaster’s political ambition with inherently grave 
implications for the country’s democracy.
Assessing Security Sector Reforms and National Security Strategies in Nigeria
A national security framework is central to effective, long-term security sector transformation. 
National security can be conceptualized at both state and individual levels. At the state 
level, security implies the preservation and protection of the territorial integrity against 
threats to national sovereignty. Individual security, on the other hand, revolves around vital 
interests such as job security, social security and security against natural disaster. Against 
this background therefore, the concept of security within a country’s policy guide should 
encapsulate the new shift in understanding security. This alongside growing security threats 
perhaps informed the establishment of a new national security strategy in 2014 under the 
Jonathan administration (Premium Times, 2015).20
As noted earlier, security is inextricably linked to human development which covers the 
political, economic and social opportunities accessible to the citizenry. According to the 
Human Development Report (1994), social security, food security and environmental 
security are essential dimensions of human security (Human Development Report, 1994).21 
Also, the French White Paper on Defence and National Security, noted that a NSP or 
strategy should deliver response to “all the risks and threats which could endanger the life 
of the Nation” (French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 2007).22 Therefore, a 
comprehensive and compliant NSP recognizes all sources of threat as well as contributions 
from all security sectors within the state including governmental and non-governmental 
actors, such that it allows for broad ownership of the policy. By so doing, it intricately 
establishes a link to peace, security and stability of the state. This is the more important given 
the changing nature of insecurity, the multiplicity of actors and the effect of globalization. 
The assurance of these basic securities complements state stability and security. 
Table 4
Human Development Report Index: Nigeria 2010 - 2014
Year Rank (Total countries assessed) Categorization
2010 142 (169) Low Human Development
2011 156 (187) Low Human Development
2012 153 (172) Low Human Development
2013 152 (187) Low Human Development
2014 152 (188) Low Human development
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Available at http://hdr.undp.org
Given the new political climate heralded by democracy, and the emergence of threats by 
non- state groups such as the Boko Haram sect, re-assessing the character of the country’s 
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security became among others, paramount. In 2014, faced with the menace of Boko Haram, 
the Jonathan administration prepared what is considered the first comprehensive national 
security strategy after deliberations among key security agencies, government institutions 
and civil society organizations. The strategy codified in three different documents centres 
around three fundamental strategies of National Security, Counter Terrorism and Cyber 
Security. 
The intent of the strategy was to guide, organize, coordinate and harmonize Nigeria’s 
security and efforts. According to the President, it demands multi-sectoral, domestic and 
international approaches, efforts and cooperation and would be subjected to review every 
five to ten years depending on the circumstance. The National Counter Terrorism Strategy, 
NACTEST is aimed at achieving a number of objectives which include preventing persons 
from joining or supporting terrorist groups; strengthening protection capacity against 
terror attacks; identifying threats through detection, early warning system and appropriate 
investigation of terrorist acts; mitigating the impact of terrorist attacks by building resilience; 
and implementing a framework for the mobilization of cross-governmental efforts. On the 
other hand, the National Cyber Security aims at mitigating the country’s cyber risk exposure 
and curtailing cyber threats inimical to the national security and the economic wellbeing 
of the Nigerians. Like the NACTEST, it is guided by stated doctrines and principles for 
achieving set objectives via coordinated efforts of all partners in the country (Premium 
Times, 2015).23
Without doubt, the new strategy represents a landmark progress in the redefinition of security 
approaches to existing threats in Nigeria. Despite the sensitivity of the security issues, it is 
also noteworthy that wide consultations were made which ultimately produced the final 
documents. Indeed, certain provisions of the documents speak about the socio-economic 
and structural conditions underlying the growth of insurgent groups in many developing 
countries and in particular, Nigeria. The high rate of unemployment and economic insecurity 
have provided the opportunity for easy recruitment into terrorist formations. This socio-
economic deficiency narrative also expresses the situation in many weak states that have 
been projected to fail. The centrality of social and economic security to the security of the 
states absolutely necessitates its inclusion in the national security policy formulation and 
implementations. 
Table 5 
The State of Peace in the World: Nigeria
Year Score Sub-Saharan African ranking (Total) World ranking (Total) Classification
2016 2.877 40 (44) 149 (163) Very Low
2014 2.71 40(44) 151 (162) Low
2013 2.693 39 (44) 148 (162) Low
continued
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Year Score Sub-Saharan African ranking (Total) World ranking (Total) Classification
2012 2.801 39 (43) 146 (158) Low
2011 2.743 34 (38) 142 (153) Low
Global Peace Index
However, the swiftness in drafting the document is symptomantic of the general malaise that 
characterizes the Nigerian political leadership. The initiative seemed a forced reaction to 
the deteriorating security situation occasioned by mindless attacks by the Boko Haram sect 
rather than a proactive endeavour. Moreover, it is not clear if the new strategy contributed 
in any meaningful way to check the threat posed by Boko Haram or whether there is a 
monitoring mechanism to ensure that the guiding principles are dutifully observed. It is 
not also known if the current administration under President Mohammadu Buhari would 
be particularly interested given the circumstances that surround his own emergence and 
the instituted corruption cases against the erstwhile National Security Adviser and certain 
members of the ousted party. 
Table 6
The 15 Countries with the Highest Lack of Adaptive Capacities Worldwide, 2013-2014
Rank Country 2013
Lack of Adaptive
Capacities
Rank Country 2014
Lack of Adaptive
Capacities
1 Afghanistan 76.11 1 Afghanistan 93.37
2 Eritrea 72.57 2 Sudan 93.05
3 Niger 71.76 3 Chad 91.88
4 Mali 69.25 4 Haiti 91.04
5 Haiti 67.88 5 Yemen 91.03
6 Chad 67.61 6 Guinea-Bissau 89.71
7 Pakistan 65.94 7 Iraq 89.30
8 Sierra Leone 65.82 8 Guinea 89.29
9 Mauritania 64.86 9 Zimbabwe 89.19
10 Burkina Faso 64.44 10 Central African Republic 89.14
11 Guinea 63.88 11 Eritrea 88.67
12 Benin 63.54 12 Nigeria 88.06
13 Liberia 63.28 13 Uganda 87.68
14 Nigeria 63.07 14 Burundi 87.62
15 Comoros 63.00 15 Cote d’ivoire 87.56
Democracy Consolidation and Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Nigeria
A major challenge confronting the Nigerian state in addressing the security sector problem 
is the lack of vision. For instance, since independence to date, no Nigerian leader was 
ever prepared to take the mantle of leadership. No genuine clear vision and strategy are 
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articulated in addressing national challenges. In situations where the vision exists, political 
will is lacking. And where there is political will, past military leaders, couched in civilian 
garb arrogate the management of the country’s security to themselves being once themselves 
in the force and therefore not open to inputs from other relevant actors. Even under civilian 
rule, no conscious effort is made to involve relevant stakeholders in a manner that ensures 
the sustainability of such actions or policies. A corollary to this is the fact that Nigeria 
has not completely extricated itself from military entanglement. Aside from Presidents 
Yar Adua and Goodluck Jonathan, President Obasanjo, a former military leader was in the 
saddle for eight years. Consequently, they adopted the fire brigade approach that window 
dresses the problems without addressing the root causes. 
Another challenge revolves around the exercise of oversight functions by respective 
institution chiefs among which is the National Assembly. Apart from the routine duty of 
confirming appointments and establishing committees to oversee the affairs of various 
security sectors in Nigeria, much of the Assembly’s activities are already predetermined by 
the ruling party. In essence, the recourse to promoting the ‘one-party’ state has impacted 
on policy direction and formulation. The effectiveness of oversight and monitoring is very 
much in doubt. For instance, the request for additional funds by the defence ministry in late 
2014 to facilitate the combat against Boko Haram was questioned by the then opposition 
party on the claims that they could not account for the billions of dollars that were hitherto 
allocated for the same purpose (The Punch, 2014).24 This was more worrisome because 
no concrete progress was being made at the time against Boko Haram. In another vein, 
widespread corruption within the various government institutions has tended to undermine 
the nation’s capacity to fairly and openly respond to pressing national security issues.
Again, while civil societies have done creditably well, they do not seem to have done enough 
to galvanize and stimulate the interests of the general public about the security sector. Civil 
societies have important roles to play in this regard by serving as agents or purveyors of 
knowledge that encourage the public to engage productively in the policy-making process. 
Most CSOs seem uninterested in security sectors matters, at least, relative to other spheres. 
Democracy affords the country the platform to inspire discourses that educate the public 
on the critical link between development and security such that accountability and integrity 
are ensured by all and sundry. Despite the passage of the Freedom of Information (FoI) bill 
which further strengthens the role of the CSOs as watchdogs over government’s activities, 
it is yet to be fully taken advantage of.
Funding is a vital component of security sector reform and its sustenance over the long 
term.  With the current state of the security sector in Nigeria, reform aimed at democratizing 
and improving its capacity to deliver will require staggering funds. Given the new 
conceptualization of security, funding the security apparatus should not come at the expense 
of other equally important institutions. Nigeria, like many other African countries, has 
been wary of partnering with countries like France, Britain, and the United States due to 
a number of factors some of which include the fear of political interference, the French 
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factor in the sub-region, covetousness of its oil resource but mostly because of the western-
oriented prescriptions that do not take into cognizance local and regional contexts. Even 
then, allocating huge sums for security at the expense of other socio-economic needs (as 
was the case in the 2014 national budget) that could help address the fundamental causes not 
only gives birth to insecurity but sustaining them may be counterproductive.
Similarly, there are usually cabals within the state with vested interests who may work to 
sabotage the effort at restructuring Nigeria’s security sector. Indeed, the country is not a 
stranger to activities in this regard. There are certain elements who profit from the current 
malaise and who would naturally oppose or resist the change through mainly indirect 
channels. They may even work with foreign elements to frustrate the initiative and ensure that 
the status quo is preserved. The practice of appealing to ethnic sentiments and romanticizing 
poverty by political leaders has been evident in Nigeria’s political culture. This in turn has 
affected citizens’ perceptions of democracy and its dividends, thereby making it the onerous 
task of enhancing national values that promote integration and cohesion more difficult.
In addition, a major challenge, as with many other institutions in Nigeria, is corruption. 
Across the security sectors, corruption has eaten deep into the structures. It is a hydra-headed 
problem that must be confronted if the reform is to be acceptable to the public. The challenge 
is even more daunting given the length of decay and unhealthy practices that have long held 
these institutions bound. It would require a comprehensive legal and political commitment 
to ensure a credible reform. At the regional level, attempt is being made by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for a policy guide for countries to support 
the reform of the security sector. While Nigeria is a key member of the community, it has 
had difficulties in the past over ECOWAS’ integration policy such as the Free Protocol on 
Movement of Goods and Persons. Nigeria may face similar challenges since the underlying 
objective of the community’s policies is to promote integration. Therefore, any regional 
policy that cannot be adapted to internal context may be counterproductive towards any 
genuine efforts at reforming the sector. 
Deepening Democratic Ethos and Enhancing Security Management in Nigeria
At the heart of genuine democratic consolidation must be the individual and state promotion 
of the abiding principles of openness, participation and rule of law among others. The degree 
to which this is the case in Nigeria today is open to debate. Nigeria’s sixteen year experience 
with democracy has yet to empower the citizenry in a manner they can take ownership 
of critical policies and programmes that affect the nation’s well-being. People are yet to 
occupy a central place in governance despite electoral improvements. Beyond citizen’s 
engagement, this paper notes that the importance of CSOs to any reform in a democracy 
cannot be underestimated. While their participation thus far, in the security governance 
in Nigeria has been limited, they are increasingly being recognized as important actors in 
the changing political environment. These civil society including professionals, advocacy 
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groups, research and policy think-tanks, religious groups, and the media can agitate for 
change and articulate reform agendas.  Despite the challenges commonly attributed to 
most African civil society organizations, they can and should act as watchdogs and provide 
technical input. They can provide knowledge, training, research, initiate dialogue between 
the security establishments and the public. This way, they contribute to shaping policy 
formulation, policy environment and policy framework. Civil society organizations are 
therefore, indispensible partners in the attempt at democratizing the Nigerian security sector.
Also, the emergence of a new political party in the 2015 elections is widely seen as a good 
omen for Nigeria in spite of the manifold security challenges facing the country. Such change 
could offer numerous opportunities for all stakeholders involved in the democratization 
process In this light, Nigeria must take advantage of the somewhat favourable domestic and 
external environment to re-engage all stakeholders to confront national security challenges. 
Identifying the need for reform is not as important as being guided by the norms and 
standard practices that would yield the desired result whether in the short or long term. 
It is, therefore anticipated that all relevant actors would seize the opportunity to promote 
human security which should further complement state security, enhance human rights and 
strengthen human development in Nigeria (Commission on Human Security, 2003).25
Beyond the aforementioned however, the rule of law, a truly democratic constitution and 
viable institutions are key to effective democratic governance. Over-centralization of control 
of the armed forces and various national security agencies in the hands of the executive 
may continue to hinder the strengthening of the country’s democracy. This is crucial for 
institution building to restore legitimacy and trust, through accountability and transparency. 
Independence is also important for the legislature to carry out its oversight functions. Also, 
the creation of a professional ethos within the security services that is consistent with the 
dictates of modern democracy must be developed, implemented and monitored to ensure 
that the benefits of democratization is not lost on the overall security well-being of the 
country. Lastly, given the role that Nigeria continues to play in the sub-region, intervening to 
restore and promote democracy and economic development, an enhanced national security 
sector will further legitimize its actions and possibly reduce the incidences of conflicts and 
improve conflict management approaches in West Africa.
Conclusion
A sustainable, functional democratic system remains pivotal to ensuring effective security 
management in Nigeria. From a policy perspective, the country seems to be on the right 
path as it continues to modify its security structures in line with global best practices and 
standards. The idea of human security continues to permeate the conception and discourse 
on national security due largely to the increasingly visible roles played by new actors such 
as the civil society organizations in the security sector. Despite these gains, numerous 
challenges persist ranging from poor or inhumane implementation of security policies, 
ingrained military culture, entrenched corruption, lack of political will, fractured ethnic 
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relations, institutional weakness, and lack of trust between the government and the citizens, 
among others. Consequently, the process of democratic consolidation in Nigeria has been 
slow and largely unaccountable.
To build a resilient democratic system and a human-centered security architecture that is 
mutually reinforcing, institutions in Nigeria must be strengthened to reflect the values and 
ethos of democracy. The three arms of the government – executive, legislature and the 
judiciary must be purged of every vestige of corruption while simultaneously putting in 
place a mechanism for the re-orientation of essential national values. Also, there is the need 
for the CSOs to play a greater role in the management of Nigeria’s security by emphasizing 
the importance of security to democratic consolidation. Finally, attempts must be made 
to deepen the country’s democracy by ensuring inclusive policies that promote a sense of 
belonging and patriotism.
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